the aims of the former as not to recognize, in the stipulation above referred to, the necessary consequence of a scheme having for its object a control over the trade of Annam, so complete as to justify Her Majesty's Government in regarding those stipulations from a political as well as a commercial point of view.
In point of fact, it would appear that the practical effect of the Political Treaty when fully completed by that of the Commercial Treaty, may be not only to place the Custom-houses of Annam under the exclusive supervision of France, and their conduct under her special protection by means of French ships of war in open ports, as well as to give to the same European Power exclusive command of access to the Chinese Province of Yunnan by means of the Tongka River, but also to complete the surrender to French agents exclusively of whatever real authority may have been hitherto possessed by the King of Annam in political as well as commercial matters.
Such a result would constitute, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, an unprecedented departure from the salutary understanding which has hitherto governed the common practice of the great European Powers in their commercial and political dealings with countries in the category which Annam belongs, and Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, full confidence that the remonstrances contained in this Memorandum will not be disregarded by the friendly Government of France, whose National Assembly, in the Report of its Committee on the Political Treaty, to which the Commercial one is attached by its concluding Article, has referred with pride to the part taken by France in concert with England towards procuring for the common advantage of European commerce, the opening of the Treaty ports of China.
Paris, November 15, 1874.
Ford Lytton
(Received November 23, 1874.)
(No. 1,124.)
Paris, November 23, 1874.
My Lord,
WITH reference to my despatch No. 1,105 of the 17th instant, on the subject of the French Commercial Treaty with the King of Annam, the Duc Decazes informs me that he has referred to the Minister of Marine the Memorandum, of which copy was inclosed in that despatch.
He says that he experiences the greatest difficulty in exercising any control over the action of the French Ministry of Marine and Colonies in matters of this kind. In fact, the Naval and Colonial Department pertinaciously pursues a traditional policy of its own without the slightest reference to his wishes or advice. He assures me, however, that the Treaty in question cannot in any case be submitted to the National Assembly for a considerable length of time; and that, quite independently of the protest of Her Majesty's Government, it is extremely improbable that it will ever be ratified in its present form; as there has been a flaw in the formalities which vitiates its signature and necessitates further negotiations with Annam.
I have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F.O.
19
sketch of information which he had received from Admiral Dupré, the late Governor of Saigon, and the originator and negotiator of the Treaties.
"There appeared," he told me, "to be little more than 300 Frenchmen in Saigon, of whom only one had any important establishment. The only flourishing merchants in the Colony were Germans. Little or nothing had been done to take advantage of the natural capabilities of the soil. The Colony produced, nevertheless, an excess of revenue over expenditure, and this surplus was remitted to France. Having found the condition of the Colony to be as thus described, Admiral Dupré had come to the conclusion that the best plan for developing its prosperity would be to open a trade with the neighbouring countries, and that, in order to do this with practical advantage, it would be necessary that the trade should be offered on equal terms to the enterprise of all nations, and that no attempt should be made to secure special privileges for France. It was with a view to making a Commercial Treaty on these principles that the Admiral had entered into negotiations with Annam."
From the account thus given by the Duc Decazes of Admiral Dupré's motives, it is easy to account for what he actually did. He wanted to bolster up the Colony of Saigon by making it a depôt for trade with the neighbouring countries. He saw that it would be vain to trust to French enterprise to effect this, and he therefore determined to open the Kingdom of Annam to foreign trade, and to the trade of all European nations. But there was no natural reason why the trade thus opened should come to Saigon, and therefore he resolved upon endeavouring to attract it to this French Colony by making all merchandise not passing that way liable to double duty. It was partly, perhaps, from the love of minute regulations and restrictions which characterises the French administration, but mainly, no doubt, in order to take every possible precaution with a view to making the trade accrue to the special advantage of Saigon, that the arrangements were devised, by which the control of every commercial transaction in Annamese ports is placed in the hands of French officials.
To return, however, to the Memorandum given me yesterday by the Duc Decazes, it may suffice to observe shortly that it disposes of the objections made to this control over the commercial transactions of other nations in Annam, and to the jurisdiction given to French agents over the subjects of those nations in that country, by saying that the exercise of this control and jurisdiction will be to the advantage of those who are to be submitted to it. No reason is assigned to justify the assignment of these powers over foreigners in a country not belonging to France to French officials, to the exclusion of the Consular or other authorities of the nation to which such foreigners belong.
Strong objections to this jurisdiction in principle were put forward in the English communication, but no answer on the point of principle is contained in the French Memorandum.
It is, however, the questions of principle which are, at the present moment, apparently the most important. There is, I suppose, no British trade with Annam at this time, and it may be doubted, considering the spirit in which these Treaties have been made, and in which they will probably be executed by the French, whether they are ever likely to develop a commerce of any importance. If, however, circumstances, independent of the Treaties, should ever make it possible or advisable for Great Britain to establish commercial relations with Annam, the French privileges would be a considerable obstacle to doing so, and might then become as objectionable in practice as they now are in principle.
It is affirmed in the French Memorandum that the Treaty of the 14th January, 1874, between England and Perak has a wider scope than would appear from the summary of it given in the English communication of the 15th November.
It would be a natural conclusion, from the fact of the Duc Decazes having given me the French Memorandum unofficially, and as open to amendment, that he himself is not disposed to set aside the observations of Her Majesty's Government, and proceed to submit the Treaty to the Assembly for ratification without further communication with them. If, however, he goes out of office, his successor may take a different view, and, even if he remains in, he may be overruled by the Department of Marine and his colleagues.
I purpose to wait for instructions from your Lordship as to what observations Her Majesty's Government desire me to make before I comply with the Duke's invitation to talk his Memorandum over with him; and, although he seems to propose only an oral discussion, I should nevertheless be disposed to take with me some written paper and leave it with him.
Unless Her Majesty's Government deem it advisable to let the matter drop, and without further remonstrance to leave the French Government to take its own course, it will be advisable that the Memorandum should not be too long unnoticed, lest silence should be construed into acquiescence, and at the same time that there should exist...
Page 164
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the aims of the former as not to recognize, in the stipulation above referred 10, the nexessary consequence of a scheme having for its object a control over the trade of Annam, so complete as to justify Her Majesty's Government in regarding those stipula- tions from a political as well as a commercial point of view.
In point of fact, it would appear that the practical effect of the Political Treaty when fully completed by that of the Commercial Treaty, may be not only to place the Custom-houses of Annam under the exclusive supervision of France, and their conduct under her specal protection by means of French ships of war in open ports, as well as to give to the same Furopean Power exclusive command of access to the Chinese Province of Yunnan by means of the Tongka River, but also to complete the surrender to French agents exclusively of whatever real authority may have been hitherto possessed by the King of Annan in politica as well as commercial matters.
Such a result would constitute, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, an unprecedented departure from the salutary understanding which has hitherto governed the common practice of the great Epean Powers in their commercial and political dealings with countries in the category which Annam belongs, and Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, full confidence the the remonstrances contained in this Memorandum will not be disregarded by the friendly Government of France, whose National Assembly, in the Report of its Committee on the Political Treaty, to which the Commercial one is attached by its concluding Article, has referred with pride to the part taken by France in concert with England towards procuring for the common advantage of European commerce, the opening of the Treaty ports of China.
Paris, November 15, 1874.
Ford Lytton
(Pescived
(No. 1,124.)
Paris, November 23, 1874. My Lord,
WITH reference to my despatch No. 1,105 of the 17th instant, on the subject of the French Commercial Treaty with the King of Annain, the Duc Decazes informs me that he has referred to the Minister of Marine the Memorandum, of which copy was inclosed in that despatch.
He says that he experiences the greatest difficulty in exercising any control over the action of the French Ministry of Marine and Colonies in matters of this kind. In fact, the Naval and Colonial Department pertinaciously pursues a traditional policy of its own without He assures me, however, that the Treaty the slightest reference to bis wishes or advice. in question cannot in any case be submitted to the National Assembly for a considerable length of time; and that, quite independently of the protest Her Majesty's Government, it is extremely improbable that it will ever be ratified in its present form; as there has been a flaw in the formalities which vitiates its signature and necessitates further negotiations
I have, &c. with Annam.
(811
(Signed)
LYTTON.
F
19
sketch of information which he had received from Admiral Dupré, the late Governor of Saigon, and the orignator and negotiator of the Treaties.
"There appeared," he told me, "to be little more than 300 Frenchmen in Saigon, of whom only one had any important establishment. The only flourishing merchants in the Colony were Germans. Little or nothing had been done to take advantage of the natural capabilities of the soil. The Colony produced, nevertheless, an excess of revenue over expenditure, and this surplus was remitted to France. Having found the condition of the Colony to be as thus described, Admiral Dupré bad come to the conclusion that the best plan for developing its prosperity would be to open a trade with the neighbouring countries, and that, in order to do this with practical advantage, it would be necessary that the trade should be offered on equal terms to the enterprise of all nations, and that no attempt should be made to secure special privileges for France. It was with a view to making a Commercial Treaty on these principles that the Admiral had entered into negotiations with Annam."
From the account thus given by the Duc Decazes of Admiral Dupré's motives, it is easy to account for what he actually did. He wanted to bolster up the Colony of Saigon by making it a depôt for trade with the neighbouring countries. He saw that it would be vain to trust to French enterprise to effect this, and he therefore determined to open the Kingdom of Annam to foreign trade, and to the trade of all European nations. But there was no natural reason why the trade thus opened should come to Saigon, and therefore he resolved upon endeavouring to attract it to this French Colony by making all merchandize not passing that way liable to double duty. It was partly, perhaps, from the love of minute regulations and restrictions which characterises the French administration, but mainly, no doubt, in order to take every possible precaution with a view to making the trade accrue to the special advantage of Saigon, that the arrangements were devised, by which the control of every commercial transaction in Annamese ports is placed in the hands of French officials.
To return, however, to the Memorandum given me yesterday by the Duc Decazes, it may suffice to observe shortly that it disposes of the objections made to this control over the commercial transactions of other nations in Annam, and to the jurisdiction given to French agents over the subjects of those nations in that country, by saying that the exer- cise of this control and jurisdiction will be to the advantage of those who are to be submitted to it. No reasou is assigned to justify the assignment of these powers over foreigners in a country not belonging to France to French officials, to the exclusion of the Consular or other authorities of the nation to which such foreigners belong.
Strong objections to this jurisdiction in principle were put forward in the English communication, but no answer on the point of principle is contained in the French Memo- randum.
may
It is, however, the questions of principle which are, at the present moment, apparently the most important. There is, I suppose, no British trade with Annam at this time, and it be doubted, considering the spirit in which these Treaties have been made, and in which they will probably be executed by the French, whether they are ever likely to develop a commerce of any importance. If, however, circumstances, independent of the Treaties, should ever make it possible or advisable for Great Britain to establish commer- cial relations with Annam, the French privileges would be a considerable obstacle to doing so, and might then become as objectionable in practice as they now are in principle.
It is affirmed in the French Memorandum that the Treaty of the 14th January, 1874, between England and Perak has a wider scope than would appear from the summary of it given in the English communication of the 15th November.
It would be a natural conclusion, from the fact of the Duc Decazes having given me the French Memorandum unofficially, and as open to amendment, that he himself is not disposed to set aside the observations of Her Majesty's Government, and proceed to submit the Treaty to the Assembly for ratification without further communication with them. If, however, he goes out of office, his successor may take a different view, and, even if he remains in, he may be overruled by the Department of Marine and his colleagues.
I purpose to wait for instructions from your Lordship as to what observations Her Majesty's Government desire me to make before I comply with the Duke's invitation to talk his Memorandum over with him; and, although he seems to propose only an oral discussion, I should nevertheless be disposed to take with me some written paper and
leave it with him.
Unless Her Majesty's Government deem it advisable to let the matter drop, and without further remonstrance to leave the French Government to take its own course, it will be advisable that the Memorandum should not be too long unnoticed, lest silence should be construed into acquiescence, and at the same time that there should exist
164
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